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This briefing paper provides a compact com-
parison of the mining laws of Finland and the 
Kyrgyz Republic. The paper has been pre-
pared as part of the research project “Envi-
ronmental Security, Mining and Good Gov-
ernance” funded by the Finnish Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs. The briefing paper contrib-
utes to an increased understanding on the 
part of the project’s parties and stakehold-
ers of the differences in mining legislation 
in countries like Finland and Kyrgyzstan. The 
comparison also generally highlights the va-
riety of issues that can be regulated in a legal 
instrument controlling mining activities.
 This note is structured as follows. First, the 
regulation of mineral exploration in Finland 
and Kyrgyzstan is briefly compared. There-
after, the note proceeds to providing over-
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views of the countries’ legal regulation on 
mineral development licensing, mine closure 
and small-scale mining. The briefing paper 
concludes with a brief summary of key find-
ings and a few notes on the current state of 
the Kyrgyz mining policy.
 It is to be noted that this brief comparison 
note is on the part of Finland limited to the 
examination of the principal legal instrument 
regulating mining, the Mining Act of 2011.¹ 
Other relevant legal acts, especially on envi-
ronmental protection and environmental im-
pact assessment, are more cursorily looked 
upon. On the part of Kyrgyzstan, other rel-
evant laws besides the Mining Act have been 
examined, the Law on Subsoil of the Kyrgyz 
Republic² being naturally the most important 
one.
4According to the Mining Act, all have the right 
for mineral exploration (i.e., doing geological 
measuring and observations and taking minor 
samples). Exploration may also be conducted 
in areas where the operator does not have own-
ership, provided that no damage is caused, or 
the harm or disturbance that is caused is only 
minor.³
 An exploration licence is needed from the 
mining authority if the exploration work does 
not comply with the legal requirements re-
garding the harm caused and the areas that 
are closed to mining, or if the landowner has 
not consented to the exploration activities. 
There are also other requirements stipulat-
ing conditions when an exploration licence is 
needed; for instance, if the activities can cause 
harm to public health or general security.⁴
Mineral exploration (except of small-scale 
artisanal mining activities⁵) always needs a 
specific licence in Kyrgyzstan. The licence pre-
scribes the maximum size of the licensed area 
and the minimum amount of annual invest-
ments for geological study per unit of licensed 
area.6 Furthermore, consent of the owner of 
land rights to conduct geological study is need-
ed,⁷ this means obtaining temporary land-use 
rights.
KyrgyzstanFinland
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minEral Exploration
5The Council of State (government) gives per-
mission to redeem a mining site and deter-
mines a mining licence for uranium and tho-
rium. The mining authority (Finnish Safety 
and Chemicals Agency) determines all other 
mining licence issues.⁸
The State Agency for Geology and Mineral 
Resources9 is the main licensing authority. It 
issues mining licences and executes licence 
agreements. Other relevant instruments, such 
as mineral development or investment agree-
ments, are negotiated and executed by the 
government. However, concession agreements 
can be concluded between the mining com-
pany and the empowered body, i.e., the State 
Agency for Geology and Mineral Resources.¹0 
 Local authorities have a role especially in 
smaller mining projects. Neither the identifi-
cation or tasks of mining authorities nor their 
division of work is defined in the current Law 
on Subsoil.¹¹
licEnSing of minEral dEvElopmEnt
The Mining Act of Finland holds that stake-
holders must be given an opportunity to make 
recorded comments before a decision on a 
mining-related licence is taken. Actors other 
than stakeholders must be given an opportu-
nity to express their opinions.¹²
 The main legal instrument regulating pub-
lic participation in mining projects is the Act 
on Environmental Impact Assessment Pro-
cedure.¹³ The EIA Act lays down detailed re-
quirements for information-sharing, public 
hearings and accounting of public inputs in the 
final decision-making. The EIA procedure is 
set to include also the relevant social impacts 
of projects.
The Law on Subsoil does not address public 
participation in the licensing procedure in any 
way. Despite recommendations towards in-
creasing openness, the mining permitting pro-
cess has not been open to direct civil society 
participation. During recent years, however, 
the public has been involved, to some extent, 
in the permitting activities. An advisory board 
has been established and civil society partici-
pation is also allowed in the licensing commis-
sion. However, the State Agency for Geology 
and Mineral Resources has the ultimate power 
to decide about licences, and public participa-
tion may sometimes be more pro forma than 
really influential on the final outcome. 
authority
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public participation
6KyrgyzstanFinland
The Law on Subsoil lays down the conditions 
on the basis of which a licence application may 
be rejected. These are: if the applicant has 
produced erroneous data about itself; if the 
applicant does not have the required financial 
resources for effective, technically and eco-
logically safe development of the subsoil allot-
ment; or if a licence has been already issued or 
an application has already been registered for 
the allotment.¹⁸
If there are significant reasons to suspect 
that the applicant has no means or intention 
to start mining activities or the applicant has 
previously seriously neglected obligations re-
lated to the Finnish mining law, an application 
for a mining licence may be rejected. Even if 
the legal requirements for a mining licence 
were fulfilled, a licence cannot be issued if the 
mining activity will cause danger to public se-
curity, cause significant harmful environmen-
tal impacts or significantly weaken the living 
and industrial conditions of the area and if 
these risks and impacts cannot be removed by 
licence conditions.¹⁷
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reasons for not issuing a mining licence
 Kyrgyzstan has made its legislation conform 
to the requirements of the Aarhus Conven-
tion¹⁴ on public’s environmental rights. En-
vironmental impact assessments are legally 
required to be carried out on new mining pro-
jects. Public participation is mandatory at all 
stages of the environmental impact assess-
ment procedure.¹⁵ In addition, Kyrgyz mining- 
related regulations mention the assessment of 
social impacts in the instructions on the en-
vironmental impact assessment procedure.¹6 
Despite the advanced guidelines, these prac-
tices have been criticized for not ensuring the 
engagement of public in a proper way.
public participation
7duration of licences
Licensing of Minaeral Development
KyrgyzstanFinland
The process is in principle very simple: an 
operator sends in a licence application, after 
which the appropriate authorities determine 
whether to grant a licence. The licence will 
contain all the conditions placed on the explo-
ration or mining activity.
In Kyrgyzstan, after operators have submit-
ted licence applications, the subsoil use rights 
are granted by a tender and by direct negotia-
tions.²9 However, if the applying company has 
discovered a deposit after a legal exploration, 
it has an exclusive right to obtain a licence for 
its mining (i.e., no tender process is needed).³0
 A licence agreement to be negotiated be-
tween the mining operator and the appropri-
ate authority is an integral part of the licence, 
which is not valid without it.³¹ Mining com-
panies may also enter into more negotiable 
investment or concession agreements with the 
government.
licensing process
An exploration licence is initially issued for 
the period of up to two years, with the follow-
ing extension for up to 10 years, provided that 
the conditions of the licence agreement are ob-
served.²⁷
 A licence to develop mineral deposits (a min-
ing licence) is granted for a period established 
on the grounds of a technical project docu-
ment, but for no longer than 20 years with the 
subsequent extension pending the depletion of 
mineral stocks.²⁸
An exploration licence may be issued for up to 
four years.¹9 The duration may be prolonged 
for up to three years at a time, for the total 
maximum time of 15 years per licence.²0
 A mining licence is valid for an indefinite 
time.²¹ The mining authority must check the 
conditions of the licence every ten years at a 
minimum.²² A mining licence may also be is-
sued for a certain period of time if that is rea-
sonable. Such a licence may be issued for the 
maximum of ten years.²³ The validity of the 
licence may be prolonged by ten years at a 
time.²⁴
 A licence for gold washing is issued for the 
maximum period of four years.²⁵ The licence’s 
validity may be prolonged for the maximum of 
three years at a time.²6
8The Kyrgyz mining regulations do not recog-
nize a particular security permit, (however, 
a similar type of permit is issued by another 
organization: Gosgortechnadzor)³⁷ the Law 
on Subsoil merely states that the appropriate 
government agencies and subsoil users, within 
the scope of their competence, “must ensure 
compliance with the requirements of the leg-
islation and safety standards (norms, rules) of 
subsoil use works approved in accordance with 
the established procedure.”³⁸
The Finnish legislation has introduced a spe-
cial mining security permit.³⁵ Such a permit is 
needed from the mining authority for the con-
struction and productive operation of a mine. 
The requirements for the validity of the permit 
correspond to those of a mining permit.³6 
KyrgyzstanFinland
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According to the Law on Subsoil, a licensee 
may, with the consent of the state subsoil use 
authority, pledge the licence rights to third par-
ties for additional funding of the project with 
regard to the licensed object. The third party, 
to which name the licence is re- registered, 
shall assume obligations of the former licensee 
set forth in the licence agreement.³³ In addi-
tion, the subsoil user has the right to, with the 
consent of the government agency for subsoil 
use, to assign the rights provided by licences 
to geological and industrial development of 
the subsoil to other persons, provided that 
the terms of the licence agreement will be ob-
served.³⁴
An exploration, mining and gold washing li-
cence may be transferred to a third party if 
that party fulfils the same requirements posed 
by the mining law as were applicable to the 
original holder of the permit.³²
transfer of the licence to a third party
9KyrgyzstanFinland
Fees
There are a number of specific fees and taxes 
that a mining company active in Kyrgyzstan 
has to pay in different phases of its operations. 
According to the Kyrgyzstan Tax Code,⁴⁴ a 
mining company is subject to bonus and royal-
ty payments. The former are one-off payments 
for the right to use the subsurface for the pur-
pose of a geological survey and the exploration 
of mineral deposits.⁴⁵ The rate for the bonus 
is set by the government using a classification 
chart for all kinds of mineral resources de-
pending on the exploration stage and size of 
the deposit.
 According to the Tax Code, a royalty is paid 
monthly by mining companies once they have 
started the extraction of minerals from the 
subsoil. The royalty is essentially a tax on min-
eral production. The rate of the royalty is set 
for each type of mineral resource per unit of 
physical volume or as a percentage of the pro-
ceeds.⁴6 
 The land tax or land-use fee is to be paid on 
top of the bonus or licensing fee. It is a kind 
of annual payment for licence rights. The land 
use fee has different rates for exploration and 
production.⁴⁷
 Other taxes or fees related to mining include 
an emergency fund payment of 1.5 per cent of 
gross revenues.⁴⁸
 In addition to the official tax regime, the tax 
rates of mining companies operating in Kyr-
gyzstan may be determined by the arrange-
ments in mining development agreements. As 
these agreements are negotiated between the 
company and the government, they may be 
made to contain a scheme of special treatment 
with regard to the tax (mining-related and 
other) system for the company. This kind of an 
agreement, ratified by the Kyrgyz Parliament 
and hence having legal force, has thus far been 
made on the Kumtor deposit only. 
 It should be noted that small-scale artisanal 
mining is exempted from the payment of taxes 
on use of subsurface.⁴9
The holder of a mineral exploration licence 
must pay annual compensation to the owners 
of the real property in the exploration area.⁴0 
The holder of a mining licence must pay an-
nual quarry compensation to the owners of the 
real property in the mining area.⁴¹ In addi-
tion, compensation payments should be made 
based on the value of the excavated and uti-
lized minerals and other mining material.⁴² 
Also gold washers are required to pay annual 
compensation to the authority that controls 
the area.⁴³
fEES³9
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When applying for a licence, a mining opera-
tor must also provide information concerning 
the termination of the activity and the related 
measures.⁵0 
 The mining operator is required in the de-
sign and construction of the mine as well as in 
its operation to prepare for the safe termina-
tion of the mining activities and closure of the 
mine.⁵¹ At the latest after two years after the 
mining activities have stopped, the mining op-
erator must bring the mining area and the sup-
porting area to the condition that is required 
by public safety, take measures of repair, 
clean-up and landscaping and take measures 
that are in this respect required in the mining 
and mining security licences.⁵²
 The mining authority must conduct a final 
inspection after it has received a notification 
from the mining operator that it has completed 
the measures for mine closure.⁵³
 After mining activities have stopped, the 
mining operator continues to be responsible 
for monitoring the area, and for the needed re-
parative measures and their costs that are due 
to the requirements in the mining licence or in 
the decision on the termination of mining ac-
tivities.⁵⁴ The mining authority takes the final 
decision on the termination of mining activi-
ties.⁵⁵
In Kyrgyzstan, once a company has completed 
mining works, it is legally obliged to close the 
mine. The Law on Subsoil states that subsoil 
users must “bring land plots and other natu-
ral objects disturbed during the subsoil use 
into the state that is suitable for further use 
thereof in compliance with the normative re-
quirements.”⁵6 The Land Code requires that 
the mining operator must at his own expense 
bring the land plots as close as possible to their 
initial condition, and where impossible, in-
demnify the land owner/user for any damages 
caused by the reduction of the value of the land 
plot.⁵⁷
 The subsoil users who operate under a li-
cence are required to present their financial 
guarantees for restoration of the damaged en-
vironment.⁵⁸ Furthermore, licensing agree-
ments for exploitation of deposits typically 
require the miner to environmentally restore 
the mine site after use. Generally, mine closure 
includes mandatory rehabilitation of the land. 
A recultivation plan is required from the com-
panies, which shall be approved by the envi-
ronmental protection and mining supervisory 
authorities.⁵9 In addition, mining companies 
must make environmental rehabilitation pay-
ments. However, it has been reported that in 
practice such guarantee is not provided due 
to the absence of established terms and con-
ditions of providing such payments.60 The 
authority responsible for mine closure is the 
Kyrgyz State Agency for Geology and Mineral 
Resources.
cloSurE of a minE
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Small-Scale Mining
The mining law specifically regulates gold 
washing as a method of small-scale mining. 
People engaged in such activity need a licence 
if they operate on state-owned land. The li-
cence covers both exploration and gold wash-
ing. The operating area must be unbroken and 
its size must not be over five hectares.6¹ The 
law also regulates the harm caused by gold 
washing, the responsibility of the operator to 
prevent and handle waste, annual reporting to 
mining authorities and the closure and reha-
bilitation of the site.6²
The Kyrgyz legislation does not pay much at-
tention to small-scale artisanal mining ac-
tivities. The Law on Subsoil only states that 
“non-industrial placer exposed minerals may 
be developed by the individual prospecting 
method without a licence.”6³ Legislation does 
not provide for specific environmental or other 
safeguards for small-scale mining.
12
Summary of rEgulatory findingS
The legal regulation of mining activities in 
Finland and Kyrgyzstan has many differences, 
yet also a number of similarities. Regarding 
exploration, it is notable that while mineral 
exploration in Kyrgyzstan always requires the 
acquisition of temporal land-use rights, in Fin-
land the general principle is that exploration 
may be conducted without formal land-use 
rights.
 The authority for granting mining licences 
is very straightforwardly arranged in Finland 
whereas in Kyrgyzstan the division of work is 
less clear. Public participation in the licensing 
procedure has been guaranteed in the Finn-
ish mining law. In Kyrgyzstan, certain proce-
dures nowadays exist, but their effectiveness 
remains uncertain. The legally specified rea-
sons for not issuing a mining licence are quite 
similar in both countries. The Kyrgyz require-
ments appear somewhat more concentrated on 
financial resources, however. The legal regula-
tion on the duration of mining licences has dif-
ferences in the countries, but the ideologies do 
not differ remarkably.
 Regarding the mining licensing process, the 
Kyrgyz version has integrated more pieces into 
it: tendering, licence agreements and other ne-
gotiations. Both Finland and Kyrgyzstan allow 
the transfer of licence rights to a third party. 
Finland has introduced a specific mining se-
curity permit, which is not recognized by the 
corresponding Kyrgyz legislation.
 In the Finnish Mining Law sections relat-
ed to fees, the emphasis is on compensation, 
other required payments are specified in other 
laws. In Kyrgyzstan, the Tax Code provides for 
a number of payments for mining operators. 
In addition, there are several other mining-
related fees.
 Both countries have quite detailed regula-
tions concerning the closure of a mine.
 The Finnish Mining Law specifically regu-
lates gold washing as a method of small-scale 
mining. A licence is required for such activity 
if it is practiced on state-owned land. The Kyr-
gyz legislation does not recognize small-scale 
mining; it is only stated that such activity does 
not require a licence.
Comparison of the Mining Laws of Finland and Kyrgyzstan
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mining conflictS in finland and KyrgyzStan
Extraction of natural resources is an activity 
and a business sector that almost inevitably 
nowadays gives rise to some sort of conflict 
situations at a local – and sometimes national 
– level. 
 Finland has experienced a mining boom in 
recent years. Increased exploration and extrac-
tion of minerals have in general been met with 
a somewhat mixed attitude by citizens. The 
positive tax revenue-raising and employment 
effects in the often relatively remote mining 
districts have been warmly welcomed. It has 
also been regarded as important that the min-
ing sector has diversified Finland’s industrial 
production. However, conflict potential has 
been found in a number of issues, especially in 
1) relations to other livelihoods and businesses 
(tourism, agriculture, outdoor recreation, rein-
deer herding and community image) and 2) en-
vironmental risks and effects.6⁴ 
 The Talvivaara mine has been a prime exam-
ple of the realized conflict potential of mining 
activities in Finland. The establishment of the 
mine was opposed by a strong group of local 
people who were afraid of its environmental 
impacts. These suspicions were later realized 
as it was found out that the mine had actu-
ally caused pollution of the local environment, 
and also one employee was killed by excessive 
sulphur dioxide at the site. These effects and 
events have received massive publicity in Fin-
land and have made Talvivaara a very contro-
versial business.
 Compared to Finland, mining conflicts in 
Kyrgyzstan are more frequent and strong, hav-
ing even included violent attacks against com-
panies. The reasons behind the conflicts are 
manifold, including economic, social and en-
vironmental factors. In general, public opinion 
holds that the mining business operates with 
an excessively revenue-maximizing attitude, 
leaving few benefits to the local community 
despite the huge profits of the sector. Further-
more, local people have not always been sat-
isfied with the prospective employment and 
health effects of the mines. Finally, the envi-
ronmental protection measures taken by min-
ing companies have not been viewed as suf-
ficient. Kyrgyz people witness bad legacies of 
the past environmental destruction caused by 
irresponsible mining industry, and the general 
trust in the capacity and willingness of authori-
ties to monitor and enforce environmental reg-
ulations is rather low. It is also many times the 
case that the communication between mining 
companies and local people is not properly or-
ganized, leading to unnecessary suspicions and 
incomplete information on both sides.
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It has been stated that a country willing to at-
tract private investors in the mining sector 
needs to develop policies in four key areas.6⁵ 
First, it needs to establish sound mining and 
investment codes with clear rules and guaran-
tees regarding exploration and mining rights. 
Kyrgyzstan has done quite well in this respect. 
However, ineffective implementation of the 
legislation and unpredictable moves by the 
government have made the mining industry 
somewhat cautious when planning new in-
vestments in Kyrgyzstan. The mining industry 
has unfortunately experienced on several oc-
casions that the country’s legislation does not 
provide sufficient guarantees for investment 
decisions.
 Second, governments must assure compa-
nies that they will have the right to mine fol-
lowing successful exploration, and that they 
will be permitted to transfer or trade explora-
tion or mining licences subject to explicit cri-
teria. In light of this criterion, Kyrgyzstan ap-
pears, again, relatively good at least on paper. 
Mining licences are usually granted, although 
the process sometimes appears quite cumber-
some.
 Third, governments need to enact fiscal re-
gimes that are competitive with and compa-
rable to those in other mining countries. This 
aspect has been taken care of in the Kyrgyz Re-
public to some extent. Changes have been in-
troduced to the tax regime in recent years, and 
nowadays Kyrgyzstan is usually considered as 
a relatively attractive country in this regard. In 
addition to the formal fiscal regime, the Kum-
tor example shows that, at least potentially, 
special mining agreements may include provi-
sions on favourable tax treatment.
 Finally, governmental institutions, which 
supervise and regulate the sector, should be 
capable of performing their duties in a pro-
fessional, fair, and transparent manner. This 
is an area where the Kyrgyz Republic has the 
most room to improve its performance. The 
division of responsibilities among authorities 
is not always very clear; they remain finan-
cially under-resourced; and corruption is still 
a problem at all levels of governance.66 Trans-
parency of regulation should be improved by 
possibilities for more effective public partici-
pation and monitoring. The latter aspect has 
seen some progress recently: public oversight 
boards have begun monitoring government 
agencies’ expenditures, distribution of licences 
and conduct of tenders. In addition, the gov-
ernment has audited more than 20 mining en-
terprises.6⁷ The findings of these audits have 
been made known to the public.6⁸ The gov-
ernment has also introduced an initiative to 
engage the public, NGOs and the media in dis-
cussing innovations in the mining industry.69 
These steps have arguably moved Kyrgyzstan 
far ahead of the other Commonwealth of In-
dependent States members in terms of mining 
transparency.⁷0 The progress is partly due to 
the Extractive Industries Transparency Initia-
tive programme that requires increasing trans-
parency in the mining policy of the country. As 
a next step of the initiative, local governments 
will be required to report to the public on their 
allocation of mining revenues.⁷¹
Comparison of the Mining Laws of Finland and Kyrgyzstan
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